How this document has been cited
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—to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, "willful" element of federal statute proscribing the deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of law interpreted to require that defendant-official be shown to have had the "specific intent... to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by … - in In re Kay, 1970 and 67 similar citations |
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—is" only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law. The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects … - in United States v. Boyce Motor Lines, 1951 and 88 similar citations |
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—the Supreme Court rendered its seminal decision defining the specific intent required to support a criminal prosecution under the federal civil rights law. - in US v. Messerlian, 1987 and 64 similar citations |
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However, under this statute a violation can be found only if the defendant acted "willfully," that is, with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law." - in Adickes v. SH Kress & Co., 1970 and 49 similar citations |
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"Under color of law means under `pretense'of law. Thus, acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew the line of their authority or overstep it. " - in Heverly v. Simcox, 2006 and 102 similar citations |
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Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its] delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States - in US v. Kegel, 1996 and 96 similar citations |
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The United States Supreme Court favors an interpretation of legislation in a manner which supports its constitutionality. - in Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 1981 and 32 similar citations |
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The requisite intent could be established by" all the attendant circumstances-the malice of [the defendant], the weapons used in the assault, its character and duration, the provocation, if any, and the like." - in United States v. Marler, 1985 and 31 similar citations |
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